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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Donald Nelson Barger, a 60-year old homeless man who calls himself a traveler and a
genius, pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance after two hydrocodone pills
were found in his vehicle, and was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with one year fixed.
Despite substantial evidence that Mr. Barger could not understand the proceedings against him
and could not assist in his defense, the district court never ordered a competency evaluation.
Mr. Barger contends the district court violated his constitutional right to due process by failing to
order a competency evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-211, as the court should have
entertained a bona fide doubt as to Mr. Barger's competence based in part on his irrational
behavior and demeanor before the court. He also contends the district court erred in denying his
pro se motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Barger was driving to the courthouse on April 16, 2018, when a police officer saw
him, knew he did not have a valid driver's license, and arrested him for driving without
privileges. (Con£ Exs., p.3.) The police conducted an inventory search of Mr. Barger's vehicle
and located, among other things, two hydrocodone pills he had from an old prescription. (Con£
Exs., p.3; 10/25/18 Tr., p.47, Ls.4-6.) The State charged Mr. Barger by Information with felony
possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.50-51.) The State filed an Information Part II
alleging Mr. Barger is a persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514.
(R., pp.52-53.)
At his initial appearance, Mr. Barger appeared pro se, and told the magistrate court, "I
don't understand why I'm here without committing a crime. Was it Karen that said I hurt her or
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who did I harm?" (4/17/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.13-15.) The magistrate court appointed Mr. Marler, a
public defender, to represent Mr. Barger. (4/17/18 Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.7, L.23.) The magistrate
court instructed Mr. Barger he was on pretrial release and, among other things, was "not to
possess alcohol or possess illegal drugs" and would be required to submit to alcohol and drug
testing upon request. (4/17/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.4-13.) Mr. Barger asked "to have the showing of the
jurisdiction for this pending jury trial." (4/17 /18 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-8.) He explained:
That will be the name of the man, the statement of the claim, and all that so I can
finish it off where I've accepted all of the charges pending certification. I'd like to
have a showing that there is certification, please, from the clerk. The statement of
the crime and the victim's words.
I require that for the hearing tomorrow so I know what I'm working with for the
jury trial. I don't understand any of that. I've been railroaded up into this jury trial
in a week, but I don't know what is going on. I do not understand why, who, any
of the points on that either.
(4/17/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-20.)
At his next appearance, Mr. Barger again questioned the magistrate court's jurisdiction.
The following exchange took place between Mr. Barger and the magistrate court:
MR. BARGER: I'm only here challenging jurisdiction with a special appearance.
I just want to see the paperwork. And when I see the claim of damages under
penalty of perjury, I can pay that and be done. I haven't seen anything along those
lines yet. I haven't seen the proof of your jurisdiction I don't know what to do.
THE COURT: Sir, how is that you are challenging jurisdiction?
MR. BARGER: As far as I can tell I'm the only man in here. I'm the only person
that can act as man. The rest are acting as government agents. I don't know who is
the man that is accusing me.
THE COURT: It's the State ofldaho.
MR. BARGER: That part of the due process that they call the jurisdiction, there's
like seven points of jurisdiction. Name the accuser, name the accused. The
statement of the victim's own words. The claim of perjury, the penalty of perjury
from the claimant. I don't remember them all off the top of my head, you know.
Due process they call it.
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THE COURT: All right. Part of the due process is make sure that you are
informed. I put that on the record already. I don't have any basis by which to give
you any relief for lack of jurisdiction.
MR. BARGER: Do your job and get that filed now.
(5/8/18 Tr., p.5, L.22 -p.6, L.21.)
Mr. Barger said he intended to waive his preliminary hearing, and the following
exchange took place:
THE COURT: And on the bottom [of the waiver of preliminary hearing form] it
says do you read and understand the English language and you put do not know.
Were you able to read and understand this form?
MR. BARGER: I can't be sure.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Marler has attempted to assist you in this case
already, is that correct?
MR. BARGER: Yes. He tries to lead me down the commercial path and makes
claims that I'm this and that.
(5/8/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.17-24.) Mr. Barger continued, "Who is the accuser? I hear State of Idaho,
but I've never seen them walking. The first question is the jurisdiction and we'll have to go from
there. That's not your job, that's the accuser's job." (5/8/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.7-10.) The district court
asked Mr. Marler ifhe had the impression Mr. Barger could assist in his defense, and Mr. Marler
answered, "Yes." (5/8/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.11-13.) The magistrate court bound the case over to
district court. (5/8/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.3-23.)
At his arraignment, Mr. Marler explained to the district court the difficulty he was having
in representing Mr. Barger. He said as he tried to "work through the criminal information with
[Mr. Barger], he just simply won't acknowledge that it's a proper document." (5/24/18 Tr., p.7,
Ls.11-14.) He explained, "So the problem I have is, anything other than shadow counsel, to
respond to any questions he might have, it becomes problematic." (5/24/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-17.)
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Mr. Marler explained, "I have represented Mr. Barger in the past and it's always been pretty
basically as shadow counsel because, again, he and I can't communicate. His rules are different
than the rules I'm obligated to abide by. So that ends up being are we able to communicate
effectively? The answer to that question is no." (5/24/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-7.) The district court
confirmed Mr. Barger was eligible for representation by a public defender, and then formally
appointed Mr. Marler, stating, "I will deal with issues as they may arise if you feel you can no
longer ethically continue to represent Mr. Barger." (5/24/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.14-16.)
At that point, Mr. Marler informed the district court that Mr. Barger took a drug test
pursuant to the terms of his pretrial release, and tested presumptively positive for
methamphetamine and marijuana. (5/24/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-19; R., pp.55-56.) Mr. Barger
requested a confirmatory test, and the district court scheduled the matter for further proceedings.
(5/24/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.17-24.)
Mr. Barger appeared before the district court for further proceedings after the
confirmatory test came back positive. (6/13/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-8.) Mr. Barger continued to
challenge the court's jurisdiction, arguing:
I have no showing of jurisdiction available. I have seen no jurisdiction. I asked to
see the name of the accusers, I've asked to see the accuser statement. I asked to
see the proof that I'm not a man. I've asked the accuser what the damages are and
she states that she was not harmed and there are no damages.
(6/13/18 Tr., p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.5.) After a brief exchange with Mr. Barger, the district court
denied what it construed as his pro se motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (6/13/18
Tr., p.10, Ls.3-4.) Mr. Barger continued to challenge the court's jurisdiction and said he felt
threatened. (6/13/18 Tr., p.10, L.9 - p.12, L.5.) The district court found Mr. Barger to be in
contempt of court, and ordered him to serve two days of local incarceration as a sanction.
(6/13/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-20; R., pp.63-69.)
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The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Barger's alleged violation of the
conditions of pretrial release, and Mr. Barger continued to challenge the district court's
jurisdiction, saying he was "only here to challenge jurisdiction with a special appearance."
(7/12/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-9.) The district court concluded it had jurisdiction. (7/12/18 Tr., p.13,
Ls.3-7.) The district court found Mr. Barger violated his pretrial release, and ordered him to
serve eight days of local incarceration as a sanction. (7/12/18 Tr., p.47, Ls.21-24; R., p.71.)
Mr. Marler told the district court Mr. Barger "is struggling with a whole bunch of issues" and is
"not quite understanding the process." (7 /12/18 Tr., p.45, Ls.8-10.)
Mr. Barger ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the State, pursuant to which he
agreed to plead guilty, reserving his right to challenge the district court's adverse rulings relating
to jurisdiction, and the State agreed to dismiss any pending misdemeanor charges and
recommend probation. (8/23/18 Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.5; 8/30/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-23; R., pp.81-90.)
The district court commended Mr. Barger for reaching a plea deal with the State. The district
court told Mr. Barger, "In my experience there hasn't been a lot of willingness on your part to
work with counsel and to work towards an end that is in your best interests. I commend you for
that, for whatever that is worth to you." (8/23/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-7.) Mr. Barger admitted he "did
have the pill" and the district court accepted his guilty plea. (8/30/18 Tr., p.19, Ls.15-22.)
At sentencing, Mr. Barger, through counsel, moved to stay sentencing so he could
consider moving to withdraw his guilty plea. (10/25/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-2, p.8, Ls.1-12.) Mr. Marler
explained Mr. Barger believed "the purpose of the sentence was just simply to be able to send it
up [to the Supreme Court] without any other action happening." (10/25/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-15.)
The district court denied "the motion to continue the sentencing to explore avenues or issues
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relative to a possible motion to withdraw his guilty plea." (10/25/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.15-17.)
Mr. Barger was given the opportunity to address the court, and said:
I don't know what to do. I've got many, many hours of questions ....
I don't understand what is going on. I supposedly have a right to understand. The
first line here is a mistake, a question of jurisdiction. It has a trade name here
instead of my true name that the court is supposed to be acting on for me as a
man. Yet it has my trade name as a corporation or trust. So without dealing with
issues like that, I don't know where to proceed ....
In fact, as far as the probation, where we have the victim now and I've agreed to
accept the charges pending certification, all we really need is for Karen to state
that I harmed her and state the amount of damages and then I have already agreed
to be bound by that.
(10/25/18 Tr., p.38, L.8 - p.40, L.6.) The district court sentenced Mr. Barger to a unified term of
five years, with one year fixed. (10/25/18 Tr., p.47, Ls.14-22.) The judgment of conviction was
entered on October 31, 2018, and Mr. Barger filed a timely notice of appeal on November 20,
2018. (R., pp.95-102.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court violate Mr. Barger's constitutional right to due process by failing to
order a competency evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-211?

IL

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Barger's pro se motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Violated Mr. Barger's Constitutional Right To Due Process By Failing To
Order A Competency Evaluation Pursuant To Idaho Code§ 18-211

A.

Introduction
In light of the substantial evidence that Mr. Barger could not understand the proceedings

against him and could not assist in his defense, the district court should have entertained a bona
fide doubt as to Mr. Barger's competence, and should have ordered a competency evaluation
pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-211. The district court's failure to order a competency evaluation
violated Mr. Barger's constitutional right to due process and constituted fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews constitutional claims de novo. State v. Lanliford, 162 Idaho 477, 484

(2017). Because Mr. Barger did not request a competency evaluation in the district court, and did
not argue he was incompetent within the meaning of Idaho Code§ 18-210, he must demonstrate
that the district court's failure to order a competency evaluation constituted fundamental error.

See id. Fundamental error is error that "(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).

C.

The District Court's Failure To Order A Competency Evaluation Violated Mr. Barger's
Constitutional Right To Due Process
"The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried

or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial."
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State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62 (2003) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1996). "The

test for competency to stand trial is whether a defendant has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational,
as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him." State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho
507, 512, 363 P.3d 348, 353 (2015) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Consistent
with this authority, Idaho Code § 18-210 provides that "[n]o person who as a result of mental
disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own
defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long
as such incapacity endures." Idaho Code§ 18-211(1) requires that when there is reason to doubt
a defendant's fitness to proceed under section 18-210, "the court shall appoint at least one (1)
qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist . . . to examine and report upon the mental
condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense or understand the proceedings."
Even when the defendant's competency has not explicitly been raised as an issue, "the
trial court must sua sponte inquire as to the defendant's competency ... if the court entertains or
reasonably should entertain a good faith doubt as to the capacity of the defendant to understand
the nature and consequences of the plea." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App. 2009)
(citations omitted). "A trial judge must conduct a competency hearing, regardless of whether one
is requested, whenever the evidence before the judge raises a bona fide doubt about the
defendant's competence to stand trial." Id.; see also State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341, 346 (1979)
("The trial court judge must always be on guard to make certain that there is no violation of
federal Fourteenth Amendment due process in any action in criminal court.") (citations omitted);
State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967, 969 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating "a trial judge is under a continuing

duty to observe a defendant's ability to understand the proceedings against him").
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Here, the district court had a duty to order a competency hearing of Mr. Barger because
the evidence before the court raised a bona fide doubt as to Mr. Barger's competence. A bona
fide doubts regarding a defendant's competence exists "if there is substantial evidence of
incompetence." Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 778 (citation omitted). "Although no particular facts
signal a defendant's incompetence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant's demeanor
before the trial judge, irrational behavior of the defendant, and available medical evaluations of
the defendant's competence to stand trial." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the district court heard Mr. Barger question the court's jurisdiction on multiple
occasions. Mr. Barger's jurisdictional arguments were irrational, and his demeanor was so
offensive to the court that it resulted in a finding of summary contempt. (R., p.63.) Mr. Barger
argued to the district court:
I have no showing of jurisdiction available. I have seen no jurisdiction. I asked to
see the name of the accusers, I've asked to see the accuser statement. I asked to
see the proof that I'm not a man. I've asked the accuser what the damages are and
she states that she was not harmed and there are no damages.
(6/13/18 Tr., p.7, L.25 -p.8, L.5.) The district court denied what it construed as Mr. Barger's pro
se motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, but Mr. Barger continued to challenge the court's
jurisdiction. (6/13/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.3-4.) The district court wrote that Mr. Barger "became
disruptive speaking in a loud disruptive voice and repeatedly interrupting, speaking over, and
arguing with the Court." (R., p.63.) Mr. Barger continued his "disruptive behavior" despite being
advised by the district court "on more than would occasion" that he would be afforded an
opportunity to speak at a later point. (R., p.63.) Based on Mr. Barger's demeanor and behavior,
the district court should have had a bona fide doubt as to his competence.
In addition, Mr. Barger's appointed counsel made multiple statements to the district court
that should have raised a bona fide doubt as to whether Mr. Barger could understand the
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proceedings against him and assist in his defense. At Mr. Barger’s arraignment, Mr. Barger’s
counsel explained he was having difficulty in representing Mr. Barger. He said as he tried to
“work through the criminal information with [Mr. Barger], he just simply won’t acknowledge
that it’s a proper document.” (5/24/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.11-14.) He said, “So the problem I have is,
anything other than shadow counsel, to respond to any questions he might have, it becomes
problematic.” (5/24/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-17.) He explained to the court he had represented
Mr. Barger in the past “and it’s always been pretty basically as shadow counsel because, again,
he and I can’t communicate.” (5/24/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-4.) He said, “So that ends up being are we
able to communicate effectively? The answer to that question is no.” (5/24/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.5-7.)
The district court understood Mr. Barger’s counsel to be raising an ethical question regarding his
representation, but failed to realize these statements also raised a bona fide issue with respect to
Mr. Barger’s competence. In a later proceeding, Mr. Barger’s appointed counsel told the district
court Mr. Barger “is struggling with a whole bunch of issues” and is “not quite understanding the
process.” (7/12/18 Tr., p.45, Ls.8-10.)
At sentencing, the district court had additional information that should have raised a bona
fide doubt as to Mr. Barger’s competence. The presentence investigation report reflects that
Mr. Barger was 60 years old, homeless, and unemployed, but referred to himself as “a traveler”
and “a genius.” (Conf. Exs., pp.3, 14, 15.) Mr. Barger stated during the presentence interview he
was not close to any of his family members because, “They don’t understand me. The prophet
has shown me the meaning of life. It has been overwhelming.” (Conf. Exs., p.13.) He said he was
“[n]ot allowed to say” what was important to him, and identified his goals in life as to “[b]attle
gravity, entropy and evil.” (Conf. Exs., p.18.) Both the GAIN evaluation and mental health
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examination report noted Mr. Barger might benefit from a formal mental health evaluation, yet
no formal evaluation was ever conducted. (Con£ Exs., pp.28, 34-35.)
At sentencing, Mr. Barger, through counsel, moved to stay sentencing so he could
consider moving to withdraw his guilty plea. (10/25/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-2, p.8, Ls.1-12.)
Mr. Barger's counsel explained Mr. Barger believed "the purpose of the sentence was just simply
to be able to send it up [to the Supreme Court] without any other action happening." (10/25/18
Tr., p.6, Ls.11-15.) The district court proceeded with sentencing, notwithstanding these concerns,
and Mr. Barger addressed the court as follows:
I don't know what to do. I've got many, many hours of questions ....
I don't understand what is going on. I supposedly have a right to understand. The
first line here is a mistake, a question of jurisdiction. It has a trade name here
instead of my true name that the court is supposed to be acting on for me as a
man. Yet it has my trade name as a corporation or trust. So without dealing with
issues like that, I don't know where to proceed ....
In fact, as far as the probation, where we have the victim now and I've agreed to
accept the charges pending certification, all we really need is for Karen to state
that I harmed her and state the amount of damages and then I have already agreed
to be bound by that.
(10/25/18 Tr., p.38, L.8 - p.40, L.6.) Despite these bizarre statements, the district court never
ordered a competency evaluation.
In State v. Fuchs, our Supreme Court held the defendant's capacity ''was not placed in
question" considering the evidence before the trial judge. 100 Idaho at 347. The Court noted the
defendant "was alert and responsive to the judge's questions" and "[h]er courtroom demeanor
was beyond reproach." Id. The Court also noted "she appeared to be quite capable of
understanding the proceedings [during sentencing] and of making a rational choice among the
alternatives." Id. Similarly, in State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819 (Ct. App. 1999), the Court of
Appeals held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for
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a mental examination because, among other things, there was "no indication that [the defendant]
could not conform his behavior to the decorum of the court." Id. at 823. The Court noted the
defendant was "appropriate, coherent and responsive to the court's questions [at sentencing]." Id.
The case at bar presents a completely different factual scenario. Mr. Barger's courtroom
behavior was irrational and he could not conform his behavior to the decorum of the court. His
responses to the district court's questions were neither appropriate nor coherent, and there are
multiple indications from Mr. Barger and his attorney that Mr. Barger could neither understand
the proceedings against him nor assist in his defense.
In State v. Hawkins, the Court of Appeals held the district court should have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's competence either to stand trial or represent himself. 148
Idaho at 782. The Court noted the defendant was capable of preparing and arguing in his own
defense, was alert and coherent, and understood and was actively involved in the process. Id. at
779. The Court also noted, however, that the defendant exhibited delusional characteristics both
before and during trial, indicating he might have been out of touch with reality and did not have
a rational understanding of the proceedings. Id. The Court determined "there was enough
evidence in this case to put the district court on notice that [the defendant's] competence was in
question," and the district court therefore abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a
competency evaluation. Id. at 782-83.
Like in Hawkins, there was enough evidence in this case to put the district court on notice
that Mr. Barger' s competence was in question. Though the district court may have believed a
guilty plea was in Mr. Barger's best interests, based on its statement commending Mr. Barger for
reaching a plea deal, see 8/23/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-7, the district court had a duty to order a
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competency evaluation under Idaho Code § 18-211, and violated Mr. Barger's constitutional
right to due process by failing to order such an evaluation.

D.

The District Courts' Error Plainly Exists And Was Not Harmless
In order to demonstrate fundamental error, Mr. Barger must show the district court's

error in failing to order a competency evaluation "plainly exists (without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether
the failure to object was a tactical decision)" and "was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
Mr. Barger can demonstrate fundamental error in this case.
First, the district court's error plainly exists, and there is no way Mr. Barger's attorney's
failure to request a competency evaluation can be seen as a tactical decision. It cannot be a
tactical decision for an attorney to decide his client should be convicted and sentenced when he
is incompetent, in contravention of United States Supreme Court authority, Idaho Supreme Court
authority, and Idaho Code § 18-210. While Mr. Barger's counsel may have believed his client
was competent, that does not absolve the district court of responsibility from itself assuring
Mr. Barger's competence. See Fuchs, 100 Idaho at 346 ("The trial court judge must always be on
guard to make certain that there is no violation of federal Fourteenth Amendment due process in
any action in criminal court.") (citations omitted); Potter, 109 Idaho at 969 (stating "a trial judge
is under a continuing duty to observe a defendant's ability to understand the proceedings against
him").
Second, the district court's failure to order a competency evaluation could not be
harmless, because there is no way to conclusively determine whether Mr. Barger was convicted
and sentenced while incompetent. If Mr. Barger was convicted and sentenced while incompetent,
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then his due process rights were violated, and the error was not harmless. See Lovelace, 140
Idaho at 62, Pate, 383 U.S. 375.
At this point, the proper remedy is to vacate Mr. Barger's conviction, and remand this
case to the district court with instructions to order a competency evaluation, and proceed further
based on the results of that evaluation. See Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783 (vacating defendant's
judgment of conviction and leaving the State free to retry defendant if he is found to be
competent because "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to [his]
competency at the time he was tried").

II.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Barger's Pro Se Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of
Jurisdiction
Mindful of the lack of legal authority supporting his position, Mr. Barger contends the
district court erred in denying his pro se motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because,
among other things, the State failed to identify the victim in this case, and failed to identify any
damages caused by his conduct. Mr. Barger has been concerned from the outset that the district
court lacked jurisdiction in this case. Though he was represented by counsel in the district court,
he repeatedly challenged the district court's jurisdiction without the assistance of counsel, and
was ultimately held in contempt of court, because he wanted to be heard on jurisdiction even
after the district court ruled against him. (6/13/18 Tr., p. 7, L.25 - p.8, L.5, p.10, L.9 - p.12, L.5,
p.12, Ls.12-20; 7/12/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-9; 10/25/18 Tr., p.38, L.8 - p.40, L.6; R., pp.63-69.)
Mr. Barger entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge the district court's
adverse rulings relating to jurisdiction. (8/23/18 Tr., p. 7, L.23 - p.9, L.5; 8/30/18 Tr., p.5, Ls. I-
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23; R., pp.81-90.) He now asks this Court to review these jurisdictional rulings, and conclude the
district court lacked jurisdiction over this case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Barger respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, and
remand this case to the district court with instructions to order a competency evaluation
pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-211, and proceed with further proceedings based on the results of
that evaluation. Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for
lack of jurisdiction.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2019.
/ s/ Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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